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"no state action putting wealthy
voters in a better position to
contribute to campaigns than nonwealthy voters." Additionally, in
Smith, African-Americans were
denied the right to vote, and the
Plaintiffs in this case made no such
claim. The court refused to
recognize the right to run a
financially successful campaign,
which it concluded was not
comparable to the right vote.
Additionally, the court noted that no
voters' rights cases supported
Plaintiffs' argument because
Plaintiffs did not allege that they
had lost their right to vote. Instead,
Plaintiffs merely alleged that their
ability to influence others prior to
voting was diminished by their lack
of wealth. The court held that there
is no fundamental right for every
voter to have the "same access to
the campaigning process."

No Fundamental Right to

Run for Office
The court next held that the
system did not violate Plaintiff
Lindner's fundamental rights as a

candidate. The system neither
violated his right to be on the ballot,
nor his right to have information
distributed to the public. The court
stated that just as in Kaplan, the
Sample Ballot and Voter
Information Booklet provided only
one way for candidates to
communicate their qualifications to
the public and candidates are only
required to pay printing costs if they
choose to use that method. Based on
this reasoning, the court held that
the County's "wealth primary" did
not violate any fundamental rights
and, therefore, did not qualify for a
"heightened scrutiny analysis."

County Reimbursement
System Passed the Rational
Basis Test
Because the court found that the
County's "wealth primary" did not
burden a suspect class or a
fundamental right, the court
analyzed the County's judicial
election process using the "rational
basis" test. Under the "rational
basis" test, a state action is valid
when it is "rationally related to a

legitimate purpose." Here, the court
found that requiring candidates to
pay the costs of printing their
statements was rationally related to
the legitimate goals of having
candidates finance their own
campaigns and keeping down the
costs to the County. The court again
emphasized that printing statements
in the Ballot merely was one of
many methods of running a
campaign.
Without applying a "heightened
scrutiny analysis," the court found
that the County's judicial election
process was valid because neither
candidates nor voters have a
fundamental right to judicial
elections that are of equal access
with regard to wealth. The court
followed the Supreme Court, which
has refused to recognize that every
candidate has a right to an equal
chance of success in election
campaigns.

Annuity Investors Held to Obligations Under Their
Group Contracts
By Bonnie Katubig

In Otto v. VariableAnnuity Life
Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 841 (7th Cir.
1998), the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the United
States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois by
holding that retirement annuity
companies are held strictly and
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singly to the contractual obligations
they set forth in their group
contracts with their investors.
Furthermore, the court found that
challenges for breaches of contracts
to those obligations must be
supported fully in the contracts.

Retirement Investment
Program Detailed Through
Contracts
Beverly Otto and several teachers
("Plaintiffs') invested in retirement
accounts with Variable Annuity Life
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Insurance Company ("VALIC"),
one of the companies their
employers had chosen for group
agreements. Each investor entered a
group unit purchase ("GUI"')
contract with VALIC. Outlined in
the GUP contract, investors could
choose either the "Variable
Annuity" or the "Fixed Dollar
Annuity" investment account.
Participants further retained the
option to place their full investment
in one account or divide their
investment between accounts, and
each account had differing rates of
return and risks.
For variable accounts, the GUP
specified that rates of return
changed with trends in the market.
Thus, investment risk was placed
with the individual investor. VALIC
guaranteed neither return of the
principal nor return on investment.
The variable account was listed as a
security, and an annual prospectus
helped explain it. For fixed
accounts, the GUP guaranteed the
principal with a 4% return on the
total funds invested. Furthermore,
any interest that accrued in the
account became principal and "the
4% was guaranteed on that new
combined amount." The GUP also
stated that, at the discretion of
VALIC's board of directors, a fixed
account may earn "excess interest."
VALIC intended to award this
excess interest when there was a
significant gap between market
interest rates and the rate that
applied to fixed accounts existed.
VALIC used one of two methods
to credit interest to fixed accounts:
the "banding" method or the
"portfolio" method. Under the
"banding method," VALIC chose a
rate of interest similar to the rate of
return the company realized on its
investments. VALIC applied and
guaranteed this rate of interest for
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funds invested in the fixed account
during the respective investment
period. If the market interest rates
rose above the rate set by VALIC in
that period, VALIC's board of
directors could then exercise its
right to award the excess interest.
With each participant's earnings
contribution, VALIC treated that
amount as a new investment at the
time it was contributed and applied
the same rate set for that period.
Under the "portfolio method,"
VALIC paid a single interest rate on
the full investment, regardless of
the duration of the investment.
VALIC based the interest rates it
applied on the average rates of
return the company realized in the
market for all of its investments.
Therefore, the interest rate under
the "portfolio method" did not rise
with the market as the rates using
the "banding method" did. VALIC
informed investors about their
investment options in various ways.
Once investors entered into the
GUP contract with VALIC, they
received a certificate detailing
certain aspects of their investment.
Investors next received an Owner's
Manual, three of which were issued
during the period in question,
which provided a more
comprehensive description of the
investments. Furthermore, VALIC
and its sales representatives
"educated the employees of nonprofit organizations... through
meetings, phone calls and
correspondence." Finally, VALIC
sent variable account investors
annual prospectuses, eight of which
were in question in the case at bar.

Plaintiffs Contested
Program's Method of Interest
Crediting
Plaintiffs contended that the

crediting method VALIC applied
from 1979-82 had a negative impact
on their investment. Plaintiffs had
entered into a GUP contract with
VALIC in March 1968. Until 1972,
VALIC applied the "portfolio
method" of interest to fixed account
funds. VALIC then switched to the
"banding method" and continued
using that approach until 1982.
With the interest rates remaining
stable from 1975-78, VALIC was
able to apply a steady 8% interest
rate. However, from 1979-82,
interest rates rose rapidly to the
peak rate of 14.5%. While VALIC
applied the higher interest rates to
the new investments made in these
years, the funds contributed prior to
1979 were permanently held at the
lower rate of 8%. Plaintiffs
therefore believed that VALIC
undercut their return rates in the
fixed accounts by using the
"banding method," which held their
previous investments to a depressed
rate, instead of applying the
"portfolio method," which would
have credited the full fixed accounts
with a rate closer to market average.
However, some participants
realized how to avoid locking in
their investments into the lower
interest rates through the practice of
"round tripping." "Round tripping"
occurred when investors transferred
their funds from the fixed to the
variable and back again to the fixed
account a day later. The
participants' total investment would
then receive the higher applicable
interest rate instead of having a
portion of their investment earn the
lower rates of previous periods.
"Round tripping" posed a financial
threat to VALIC because VALIC
could have been offering a rate of
return on these accounts that was
higher than the rate VALIC was
receiving itself. VALIC realized that

Loyola University ChicagoSchool ofLaw * 137

the practice was being used among
its investors and accordingly altered
the rules on transfers in 1979.
Under the new rule, an investment
transfer into a variable account from
a fixed account had to last for 90
days before VALIC would recognize
a retransfer to a fixed account as a
new investment. While VALIC did
not impair the investors' right to
transfer funds, investors now bore
the risk that the interest rate in the
variable account would dip below
that of the fixed account in the
90-day period. The investor also
faced the risk that the fixed account
interest rate would still be higher at
the time of retransfer as it was when
the funds were moved to the
variable account.

for the retransfer of funds.
Citing no contractual
relationship between Plaintiffs and
certain Defendants, the district
court initially found in favor of the
Defendants, except VALIC. The
jury deliberated the two counts
against VALIC, and ultimately
sided with VALIC. On appeal,
Plaintiffs challenged four primary
aspects of the trial claiming that:
(1) the jury's entering of a verdict
for VALIC was contrary to the
evidence on both counts; (2) the
district court, at the close of
Plaintiffs' case, erroneously granted
judgment in favor of VAMCO, a
subsidiary of VALIC; (3) the lower
court misinstructed the jury; and (4)
the court erred by excluding
pertinent evidence.

Plaintiffs Appealed Jury
Verdict, Jury Instructions,

and Trial Court Errors

Court Criticized the
Sufficiency of Plaintiffs'
Contractual Evidence

At trial, Plaintiffs contested two
primary issues concerning VALIC's
annuity investment program. First,
Plaintiffs argued that VALIC
violated Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by
intentionally failing to disclose
pertinent investment information,
including VALIC's use of the
"banding method" of interest
crediting on fixed accounts.
Moreover, Plaintiffs claimed that
VALIC hid the practice and the
rules of "round tripping" from
them. Secondly, they claimed that
VALIC breached contractual
obligations, including the obligation
to employ the "portfolio method" of
paying interest. As an alternative to
the breach of contract theory,
Plaintiffs contended that VALIC did
not live up to their obligation of
allowing "round tripping" when it
instituted the 90-day waiting period
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The Seventh Circuit addressed
each of Plaintiffs' contentions on
appeal. The court first discussed the
challenge to jury instructions used
in the district court proceedings. In
reviewing the jury instructions, the
Seventh Circuit applied the rule
from United Airlines, Inc. v. United
States, 111 F.3d 551 (7th Cir.1997),
by examining "whether the
instruction misstates or
insufficiently states the law."
Plaintiffs contended that the jury
should have received two sets of
instructions concerning VALIC's
contractual obligations. If the
contract was deemed unambiguous,
Plaintiffs requested jury instructions
on the meaning of, and any duties
arising from, that contract. In the
alternative, if the contract was
deemed ambiguous, Plaintiffs
argued that the lower court should

have highlighted the ambiguity and
instructed the jury on how to clear it
up.
However, the court at bar
explained that Plaintiffs' argument
relied on an erroneous assumption
of what comprised the disputed
contract. Plaintiffs pointed to
language found in the GUP
contract, enrollment certificates,
owners manuals, and the annual
prospectuses as their "contract"
with VALIC. VALIC countered that
this compilation of writings did not
create the binding contract and
argued that the GUP contract was
the contract in question. Because
the parties presented this dispute
over what constituted the contract
and its terms, the district court
could not, as Plaintiffs suggested,
give specific jury instructions about
the alleged "contract." The Seventh
Circuit ruled that the district court
properly left this dispute for the
jury, who could best determine the
intent of the parties from the
various documents. Thus, the court
ruled that the trial court had neither
misstated nor insufficiently stated
the law when it instructed the jury
"'to determine whether any or all of
the contract terms asserted by
Plaintiffs and denied by VALIC
[were] terms of the parties'
investment contracts."'

Trial Jury Had Freedom to
Determine Contractual Terms
The Seventh Circuit further
rejected Plaintiffs' contention that
the jury verdicts were contrary to
the evidence. Relying on its ruling
in Dallis v. Don Cunningham &
Assocs., 11 F.3d 713 (7th Cir.
1993), the Seventh Circuit
examined the validity of the jury
verdict on the contractual claim and

Volume 10, number 2

Recent Cases

the securities law violation by
determining whether it had a
"reasonable basis in the record."
Plaintiffs maintained that, from the
several documents that comprised
their contract with VALIC, three
contractual duties and subsequent
breaches by VALIC could be
identified. The court rejected each
contention in turn.
First, Plaintiffs argued that
VALIC was bound to follow the
"portfolio method" of crediting
interest. In support of their
argument, Plaintiffs cited the GUP
contract and the owners manual,
saying the use of the "banding
method" by VALIC resulted in a
contractual violation. Because it had
upheld the district court's decision
to leave the dispute over the
contract terms for the jury, the court
determined that the jury was
entitled to determine that the terms
of the GUP contract were VALIC's
only binding duties. Moreover, the
court noted that neither the
language of VALIC's owners
manuals nor its GUP contracts
required the "portfolio method" of
crediting.
Likewise, the court rejected
Plaintiffs' second argument that
VALIC breached a contractual duty
to provide a "complete profile" of
all the participants' accounts. The
court found no evidence of this
promise in the GUP contract but
only in the owners manuals, and the
court concluded that the jury was
free to decide that these manuals
did not create any separate
contractual duties. In addition, the
court opined that even if VALIC
had this contractual obligation, the
jury could have determined that the
quarterly reports on account interest
and activity sent by VALIC satisfied
this duty.
Lastly, the court disagreed with
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Plaintiffs' contention that the
waiting period VALIC implemented
to discourage "round tripping"
breached VALIC's contractual
obligation, allowing participants an
unrestrained right to transfer. The
court ruled that the jury had
sufficient evidence to conclude both
that the waiting period did not
hamper the right of investors to
transfer funds and that this type of
company interference with investor
"round tripping" did not violate
VALIC's contractual duty. The court
determined that since "round
tripping" posed a financial threat to
VALIC, it had the right to protect
itself by instituting this waiting
period. The waiting period did not
impair the right to transfer but
instead forced investors, not the
company, to bear the risk of loss.

Alleged Violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Unsubstantiated
The court further ruled against
Plaintiffs' allegation that VALIC
violated Rule lOb-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. For the
court to find a lOb-5 violation,
Plaintiffs would have had to prove:
"that (1) the defendant[s] made a
false statement or omission (2) of
material fact (3) with scienter (4) in
connection with the purchase or sale
of securities (5) upon which the
plaintiff justifiably relied (6) and
that the statement or omission
proximately caused the plaintiff's
damages." See Caremark, Inc. v.
Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d
645 (7th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiffs argued that VALIC
deliberately failed to disclose to
participants both that the company
was crediting interest using the
"banding method" and that the

practice of "round tripping" was
available. Plaintiffs contended that
these were significant omissions
which prevented the investors from
understanding how to maximize
their return on investment. Due to
these omissions, participants
claimed financial losses.
In reviewing these contentions,
the court found that VALIC had
notified investors of the "banding
method" of crediting and that
"round tripping" remained an
investment option through various
forms. Through VALIC's quarterly
statements, participants could
evaluate the current interest rates of
both funds and of particular rates
for the subsequent quarters. The
court stated that the jury could have
found that this method of disclosure
revealed the "banding method."
Moreover, the court supported its
conclusion by pointing to various
documents, which were sent to
employment groups outlining the
"banding method" and the stated
sales practice of explaining "round
tripping" to investors. Here again,
the court ruled that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to
find for VALIC.

Evidentiary Rulings Lacked
Foundation
Plaintiffs also challenged two
evidentiary rulings, which excluded
a document known as the Hansen
Report and an argument based upon
VALIC's prospectuses. The court
referred to the rule established in
Gagan v. American Cablevision,
Inc., 77 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 1996),
and held that "we review motion in
limine evidentiary rulings.., under
an abuse of discretion standard."
The Hansen Report, prepared and
provided to the Chicago Teachers
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Union ("CTU') evaluated the "taxsheltered annuity programs"
available to union employees. The
Hansen Report suggested that
VALIC used the "portfolio method"
while VALIC was actually using the
"banding method." Plaintiffs
maintained that VALIC did nothing
to remedy this discrepancy in their
reporting.
The court explained this holding
by citing Plaintiffs' failure to
authenticate the report which led to
the presumption that the Plaintiffs
relied on hearsay for their
argument. As Plaintiffs had failed to
assert an exception to the hearsay
rule, the district court had not

abused its discretion in excluding
this evidence. The court also struck
down the Plaintiffs' challenge
concerning the prospectus legends
by pointing to the express indication
on the legend that "no person had
the authority to give information or
to make representations with respect
to the 'offer contained in the
prospectus.'

Court Upheld Judgment in
Favor of VALIC Subsidiary

stating that since VAMCO operated
as a subsidiary of VALIC, and since
VALIC had withstood the previous
challenges from Plaintiffs, VAMCO
was necessarily free of fault as well.
In sum, the Seventh Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals
sent a warning to investors with this
ruling that group participants will
be held to the express contracts that
they have made with their
investment companies.

Plaintiffs also contested the
judgment in favor of VAMCO
issued by the trial court. The court
summarily dismissed this argument,

Seventh Circuit Allowed Small Exception for Recovery
Under the Carmack Amendment
By James J. Chandler

In Gordon v. United Van Lines,
130 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1997), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit determined that
the Carmack Amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 11707 (1994), governing
shippers' rights to recover common
carriers' losses to property,
preempted only state law claims
directly stemming from lost or
damaged cargo that had been
shipped interstate. In so finding, the
court recognized that the Carmack
Amendment did not preempt every
state law claim because a person
could still allege liability when his
claim did not arise from the "actual
loss of or damage to goods."
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Further, the Seventh Circuit held
that the Carmack Amendment
strictly prohibited the recovery of
punitive and emotional distress
damages. Last, the Seventh Circuit
found that based on the expert
testimony, the jury award was not
excessive.

United Van Lines Acted in
Bad Faith
Plaintiff Ruth Slavin ("Slavin'),
an 80 year-old widow, decided to
move from Florida to Chicago.
After meeting with a United Van
Lines' ("United") representative
twice, Slavin decided to hire the
company to move some boxes to her

new house and her most important
boxes to her daughter's, Rachelle
Gordon's ("Gordon'), house. The
latter boxes contained a large
number of photographs of historic
significance and personal value.
These historic photographs were
never insured because the United
representative, aware of Slavin's
limited mental and physical
capabilities, "wrote in the bill of
lading that Mrs. Slavin released
United from any liability for loss or
damage to the goods exceeding
$1,000." However, United admitted
at trial that it billed her for
"Replacement Cost Protection" with
a value of $10,000.
United's local agent, Cook
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